YEMEN

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, the Obama administration has rightly focused much of its attention not on Iraq but on the region of the world that most threatens our national security—the Pakistan-Afghanistan region. This was long overdue. The lost time has greatly damaged our national security and left us with fewer options in South Asia. I continue to be concerned, however, that the escalation of our military efforts in Afghanistan could further destabilize Pakistan, where the leadership of al-Qaida and Afghan Taliban operate and where Pakistani Taliban elements are seeking to extend their reach. I expressed these concerns, among other places, at a hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, the administration's envoy to the region. Ambassador Holbrooke conceded that the concern was real and that, while the administration was aware of the risk, they could not rule out these unintended consequences. Testifying before the same committee a week later, Admiral Mullen made similar comments.

The war in Afghanistan is inextricably linked to the al-Qaida safe haven in the FATA and the Afghan Taliban safe haven in Balochistan, as well as to the current conflict in the Northwest Frontier Province and to the rest of Pakistan. It is not the same war throughout the region and it would be a mistake to perceive a monolithic enemy. But we need to consider the consequences of our actions and those of our partners throughout the region.

Last year, I made a trip to Peshawar in the Northwest Frontier Province. There I met the province's leadership, as well as the extraordinary Americans working in our consulate there. During and after my trip, I expressed concern about the impact of deals made between the government and the Pakistani Taliban. Tragically, however, the situation in the NWFP got worse. Increasing violence in Peshawar included the killing of USAID employees and an attack on our top diplomat there. And the Pakistani Taliban's reach into Swat became broader and more radical, further threatening our national security and that of Pakistan. These advances must be permanently rolled back, just as safe havens in the FATA cannot be allowed to stand.

But it is not enough for us to throw our support behind the Pakistani military incursions. This is a critical moment in which it matters how Pakistan seeks to reassert its control. The displacement of over 2 million civilians, delays in assistance to and the return of the displaced, and a failure to ensure coordinated and accountable civilian-led security to the people all pose serious risks. Internal conflicts fuel terrorist recruitment and can create new safe havens. So while we have a clear interest in the success of one side—the Pakistani Government—we also have a clear interest in how this conflict is waged and how it is resolved.

At the same time, we must focus more attention beyond the safe havens and instability in South Asia, particularly on Yemen and Somalia. The threat from al-Qaida affiliates in those countries, as well as from al Shebaab, is increasing. Weak states, chronic instability, vast ungoverned areas, and unresolved local tensions have created almost ideal safe havens in which terrorists can recruit and operate. They have also attracted foreign fighters including, in the case of Somalia, Americans. Al-Qaida's long tentacles reach into these countries, and our efforts to track individual operatives are critical, just as they are in Pakistan. But, while we should aggressively pursue al-Qaida leaders, we will not achieve our long-term strategic goals if we think about counterterrorism primarily as a manhunt or if we assume there is a finite number of terrorists in the world. Conditions in places such as Yemen and Somalia create and attract new ones. That is why press stories suggesting that operatives from Pakistan are relocating, while troubling, ignore the larger strategic picture. Because of conditions on the ground, al-Qaida affiliates in Yemen and Somalia are perfectly capable of expanding their reach and capabilities on their own. And the best way to stop them is to address head-on the reasons—frequently unique to the countries in which they are operating—for their success.

The threats to our national security in Yemen are serious and are getting worse. News last month about the murder of as many as nine hostages in Yemen, which Yemeni officials have linked to groups affiliated with al-Qaida, is a reminder of the increasing violence there. As in Peshawar, our diplomats have been in the crosshairs, with the attack last September on our Embassy in Sana'a. And, as our State Department has warned, al-Qaida in Yemen's recruitment remains strong, and its tactics indicate high levels of training, coordination, and sophistication. Any serious effort against al-Qaida in Yemen will require the engagement of the government, whose capabilities and commitment are extremely weak. Yemen is a fragile state whose government has limited control outside the capital. It is also distracted from the counterterrorism effort by two other sources of domestic instability—the al-Houthi rebellion in the north and tensions with a southern region with which Sana'a was united less than 20 years ago. In other words, counterterrorism is hampered by weak governance and by internal conflicts that would not appear on the surface to threaten our interests. Our only choice, then, is to develop a comprehensive policy toward Yemen that places counterterrorism within a broader framework that promotes internal stability, economic development, transparency, accountability, and the rule of law.

And we must do this while considering the obstacles to repatriating the approximately 100 Yemeni detainees currently detained at Guantanamo Bay. I have spoken out about security gaps in Yemen, particularly with regard to the escape from detention of a terrorist operative responsible for the attack on the USS *Cole*. I support the closing of Guantanamo, but with so many of its detainees hailing from Yemen, we need to take an honest look at the weaknesses in Sana'a's justice and security systems and consider whether there is anything we can do about them.

Instability in Yemen is, of course, directly linked to conflict in the Horn of Africa. Earlier this year, the pirate attack on a U.S. vessel briefly raised awareness of maritime insecurity fostered by a lack of effective governance and insufficient naval capacity on both sides of the Gulf of Aden. This problem continues, even when it is not on the front pages, and is both a symptom and a driver of overall instability in the region. Meanwhile, refugees from the conflict in Somalia are fleeing to Yemen. According to a recent U.N. report, thirty 30,000 have crossed the Gulf of Aden this year with thousands more preparing to do so. The human cost to this exodus, as well as the potentially destabilizing affects, demand our attention. Finally, Yemen is linked to the Horn of Africa through arms trafficking that violates the U.N. embargo on Somalia and fuels the conflict there.

The threat in northern Somalia is, or should be, more apparent now than ever. Last October, terrorists attacked in Somaliland and Puntland. These are regions—and regional governments—for which we have little in the way of policy. I am not arguing that we recognize their independence, but it is in our national interest to engage them—diplomatically and economically—and to promote stability there. I have spoken frequently, and for years, about the need for a comprehensive policy for the Horn of Africa. Serious attention to the unique conditions in Somaliland and Puntland must be part of that policy.

Meanwhile, the raging conflict in central and southern Somalia is worse than ever, as a beleaguered transitional government fights a strengthened al Shebaab and allied militias. Foreign fighters have come to Somalia to fight alongside al Shebaab, including Americans, one of whom was implicated in the October terrorist attacks. Al-Qaida in East Africa thrives on the instability and has even expanded its support network south, into parts of Kenya. Yet for far too long, our policy toward Somalia has been fragmented or nonexistent. Our counterterrorism approach has been primarily tactical and has failed to confront the reasons why Somalia is not just a safe haven for al-Qaida in East Africa but a recruiting ground for increasing numbers of fighters—Somali and foreign—who are drawn to a conflict that is fueled by local and regional forces. That is why a comprehensive policy must include a serious, high-level commitment

to a sustainable and inclusive peace and why all elements of the U.S. Government need to work together toward common goals.

As in Yemen, the key to a successful strategy is the recognition that destabilizing factors in the region are linked to threats to the United States. Thus, separatism in the Ogaden or Somali region of Ethiopia, the ongoing Ethiopian-Eritrean border disputes, and the ways in which these tensions motivate the policies of these countries toward Somalia must factor into our broader regional strategy. This is complex, to be sure. But we simply have no other choice—we must recognize the complexity, understand it, and devise policies that address it.

This administration has a historic opportunity. And there are indications that lessons are being learned. The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center—whom the President rightly kept on from the previous administration—recently said the following:

> This is a global struggle for al-Qaida, but if we think about it too much as a global struggle and fail to identify the local events that are truly motivating people to join what they view as a global struggle, we will really miss the boat. We have to try to disaggregate al-Qaida into the localized units that largely make up the organization and attack those local issues that have motivated these individuals to see their future destiny through a global jihad banner.

This is the strategic framework that we have been waiting for, and it is encouraging.

But statements such as these are only the beginning. To effectively fight the threat from al-Qaida and its affiliates, we have to change the way our government is structured and how it operates.

First, we need better intelligence. Recent reforms to our intelligence community have focused on tactical intelligence—on ''connecting the dots.'' We have not tackled the gaps in strategic intelligence. We need to improve the intelligence that relates directly to al-Qaida affiliates—where they find safe haven and why. But we also need better intelligence on the local conflicts and other conditions that impede or complicate our counterterrorism efforts. And we need better intelligence on regions of the world in which the increasing marginalization of communities, resentments against local government, or simmering ethnic or tribal tensions can result in new safe havens, new pools for terrorist recruiting, or simply distractions for one of our counterterrorism partners.

Second, we need to fully integrate our intelligence community with all the ways in which our government, particularly the State Department, openly collects, reports, and analyzes information. This integration, which was the goal of legislation that I introduced in the last Congress with Senator Hagel and that twice has won approval from the Senate Intelligence Committee, is a critical component of strategic counterterrorism. Without it, we will never understand the conditions around the world—most of them apparent to experienced diplomats—that allow al-Qaida affiliates to operate, nor will we be able to respond effectively.

Third, this integration of clandestine intelligence community activities and open information gathering must include the allocation of real resources to the right people. This is fundamental. We can no longer afford to have budget requests driven by the equities and influence of individual agencies, rather than interagency strategies. And while Congress should do its part, real reform must be internalized by the executive branch.

Fourth, we need to recognize that when whole countries or regions are off limits to our diplomats, we have a national security problem. We know that regional tensions in Yemen, clan conflicts in Somalia, and violent extremism in Pakistan all contribute to the overall terrorism threat. But if our diplomats can't get there, not only will we never truly understand what is going on, we won't be able to engage with the local populations. In some cases, we can and should establish new embassy posts. For years, I have pushed for such an initiative in northern Nigeria, a region where clashes between security forces and extremists have taken hundreds of lives in recent weeks. In some cases, the security concerns are prohibitive. But there, we cannot just turn our backs; our absence doesn't make the threats go away. Instead, we should develop policies that focus on helping to reestablish security, for the sake of the local populations as well as for our own interests.

Fifth, we need strong, sustained policies aimed directly at resolving conflicts that allow al-Qaida affiliates to operate and recruit. These policies must be sophisticated and informed. We have suffered from a tendency to view the world in terms of extremists versus moderates, good guys versus bad guys. These are blinders that prevent us from understanding, on their own terms, complex conflicts such as the ones in Yemen or Somalia or, to inject two other examples, Mali and Nigeria. They have also led us to prioritize tactical operations—DOD strikes in Somalia, for example—without full consideration of their strategic impact. Conversely, we have viewed regional conflicts as obscure and unimportant, relegating them to small State Department teams with few resources and limited influence outside the Department. This must change. Policy needs to be driven by the real national security interests we have in these countries and regions, and our policies need to be supported by all elements of the U.S. Government. That includes a real recognition that, sometimes, policies that promote economic development and the rule of law really are critical to our counterterrorism efforts, and they need real resources and support from the whole of our government.

Mr. President, after 7 years of an administration that believed it could fight terrorism by simply identifying and destroying enemies, we now have an opportunity to take a more effective, comprehensive, long-term approach. The President, in his speech in Cairo, reached out to Muslims around the world. The Director of the NCTC has stressed the need to address local conditions in the global struggle against al-Qaida's affiliates. The Secretary of State has committed to aggressive diplomacy around the world. And the Secretary of Defense has acknowledged the need to increase the role and resources of other agencies and departments. Now, however, the real work begins. Changing the way the government, and Congress, for that matter, understands and responds to the national security threats facing us will not be easy. But we have no time to wait.

45TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE WILDERNESS ACT

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, as founder of the Senate Wilderness and Public Lands Caucus, I led a Senate resolution commemorating the upcoming 45th anniversary of the Wilderness Act of 1964. I am delighted the Senate passed this resolution last night, and am very pleased that Senator MCCAIN joined me in leading this effort. I also thank our other colleagues for their support as cosponsors: Senators LAMAR ALEXANDER, EVAN BAYH, MICHAEL BENNET, BARBARA BOXER, SAM BROWNBACK, RONALD BURRIS, ROBERT BYRD, MARIA CANTWELL, BENJAMIN CARDIN, SUSAN COLLINS, CHRIS DODD, DICK DURBIN, DIANNE FEINSTEIN, JUDD GREGG, JOHN KERRY, JOE LIEBERMAN, ROBERT MENENDEZ, JEFF MERKLEY, PATTY MURRAY, MARK UDALL, TOM UDALL, GEORGE VOINOVICH and RON WYDEN.

This Wilderness Act was signed into law on September 3, 1964, by President Lyndon B. Johnson, 7 years after the first wilderness bill was introduced by Senator Hubert H. Humphrey of Minnesota. The final bill, sponsored by Senator Clinton Anderson of New Mexico, passed the Senate by a vote of 73–12 on April 9, 1963, and passed the House of Representatives by a vote of 373–1 on July 30, 1964.

The Wilderness Act of 1964 established a National Wilderness Preservation System ''to secure for the American people of present and future generations the benefits of an enduring resource of wilderness.'' The law gives Congress the authority to designate wilderness areas, and directs the federal land management agencies to review the lands under their responsibility for their wilderness potential.

Under the Wilderness Act, wilderness is defined as ''an area of undeveloped federal land retaining its primeval character and influence which generally appears to have been affected primarily by the forces of nature, with the imprint of man's work substantially unnoticeable.'' The creation of a